A Florida Sesquicentennial Book

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Edited by
Michael Gannon

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4 Republic of Spaniards, Republic of Indians

Amy Turner Bushnell



In 1573 and 1574, Philip II issued three sets of laws for enlarging and governing Spain's American empire: the Ordinances of Pacification, the Ordinances of Patronage, and the Ordinances of the Laying Out of Towns. Together, they marked the end of the High Conquest period in eastern North America, of would-be conquistadors such as Ponce de León, Narváez, and De Soto, and of adelantados such as Ayllón, Luna, and Menéndez de Avilés. Future expansion would be Crown-controlled.

European fighting men were accustomed to band together under a captain for a limited military objective, after which the company would divide the spoils and disband to be free for other ventures. On the edges of Spanish empire, however, captains of conquest were waging continuous war for the sole purpose of taking captives to be sold as slaves. A resolve to end this abuse lay behind the king's new policy of pacification through gifts and conversions. In future, it would not be the military's business to advance the frontier; its mandate was to defend the advancing missionary. As patron of the church, the king was equally determined to reestablish control over the preaching orders to whom Charles V had entrusted the spiritual conquest of the Indians. He would make pastors from the "regular" clergy answer to his bishops as other priests did. Both of these new policies encouraged members of the Franciscan order, especially, to strike out for fresh mission fields.

A third matter on the king's mind was the vital flow of silver from America, threatened by the wild

Chichimeca Indians in northern New Spain and by foreign corsairs in the seaways of the Caribbean and the Gulf Stream. To guarantee the deliveries of silver, the king resorted to a presidial system of fortified outposts and ports. The soldiers and sailors stationed at a *presidio*, like those in a royal *armada*, were regular troops on wages. Unlike conquistadors, they were forbidden to take booty or captives; unlike *encomenderos*, traditional guardians of newly conquered lands, they were not entitled to the tribute or forced services of Indians. In those places where the Indians accepted Christianity, presidios were reinforced by mission provinces and converts provided a buffer zone against invasion and a source of reinforcements, provisions, and labor. Where the Indians rejected Christianity, the frontier did not advance.

Spaniards posted to a "land of constant war," whether as fighting men, missionaries, or bureaucrats, were supported by a subvention known as the *situado*, a transfer of royal revenues from one royal treasury in the Indies to another, for purposes of defense. During the seventeenth century, Florida's situado came from Mexico City, capital of the viceroyalty of New Spain, which also supported presidios on the road to the silver mines of Zacatecas and in selected ports of the Caribbean and the Philippines.

Indians who could not be pacified by the sword, the gift, or the gospel shared certain characteristics. Typically, they were seasonal nomads, indifferent to the sacraments and unwilling to settle down in farming villages on the Mediterranean model. They had a high regard for individual liberty and governed themselves by consensus rather than coercion. Finally, they could not be quarantined from contact with Spain's European rivals.

Every condition that made a pacification difficult was present in Spanish Florida. As a result, the colony would never lose its character as a military outpost. Yet, in the seventeenth century, Florida enjoyed two periods of expansion and a hinterland of productive mission provinces. This was possible because the native societies were diverse. While some Florida peoples were highly nomadic and recognized no authority above the band, others were seasonally agricultural, with paramount chiefs who exercised significant authority. Through these "lords of the land," the *caciques* (chiefs) and *cacicas* (chieftainesses), the Spaniards could implement a Conquest by Contract, establishing an autonomous Republic of Indians to share the land with the Republic of Spaniards, united by their common allegiance to God and the king.

The notarized treaties of peace or trade, acts of homage or submission, records of mission foundings, declarations of just war, and lists of

chiefs appearing before the governor that one may find in the archives are evidences of the legal side of pacification. They are the contracts, theoretically voluntary, that the Spaniards called into existence, recorded, and attempted to enforce. But the success of the Conquest by Contract and of the corollary Republics required a degree of isolation from other Europeans that a maritime periphery would find difficult to sustain.

Florida's transformation from an *adelantamiento* to a royal colony was gradual. Slowly, the situado was institutionalized, troops from the armadas were replaced by permanent garrisons, temporary treasury appointments gave way to lifetime offices, and governors began to govern in person rather than through lieutenants. When Santa Elena was abandoned in 1587, the adelantado's dream of a Greater Florida of transcontinental proportions was tabled for the more practical goal of consolidation. Promotional activities ceased, and settlement incentives to farmer families were discontinued.

If the new capital of St. Augustine was to be populated, the soldiers themselves would have to become family men, and Spanish wives were scarce. The answer was mixed marriage. By the turn of the century, half of the women in town were Indians, and many *floridanos*, although they did not advertise it, were *mestizos*, part Indian. Once an increased birthrate had brought the sex ratio closer to equilibrium, consensual unions between the Republic of Spaniards and the Republic of Indians became less common and efforts were made to enforce segregation. Indians could not come to St. Augustine without a pass, and non-Indians traveling on the king's business could stay no more than three days in a native town and had to sleep in the council house. These restrictions did not apply to the Franciscans, who could not leave their posts without permission.

Individuals of African origin added a third ethnic element to the colony. At one time, over fifty black slaves of the king were at work on the wooden fortifications, and numerous private persons owned African domestics. Taking advantage of lapses in security, many of these slaves escaped to live among the Indians or in maroon communities. Free blacks and mulattoes were called *españoles* and occupied the lower social levels of the Spanish community, being Spanish in language, faith, and fealty.

Although Philip II would have preferred it otherwise, the Spanish empire was cosmopolitan and its borders were permeable. By the unwritten rule of "foreigners to the frontiers," St. Augustine was home to several nationalities. Many of the colony's ship captains, pilots, and



The oldest European document of North American origin preserved in the United States is this page of the surviving Parish Registers of St. Augustine, Florida. Dated 24 January 1594, the first entry records the marriage of Gabriel Hernándes "a soldier of this presidio," and Catalina de Valdés. The officiating priest was the pastor of the parish church and chaplain of the garrison, Diego Escobar de Sambrana. The registers form a continuous record to the present day of Catholic life in the city. The fate of entries from 1565, when the parish was founded, to 1594 is not known.

merchants were Portuguese, often of Jewish background, and a surprising number of the residents were French. In 1607, Governor Pedro de Ybarra reported fifty-six naturalized foreigners: twenty-eight Portuguese, twenty Frenchmen, and, as artillerists, two Flemings and six Germans.

Like the Spanish presidios in North Africa, St. Augustine functioned as a penal colony, a place of exile for unruly officers, trouble-making friars, and sentenced criminals, or *forzados*. Many of the soldiers, too, were "involuntaries," with records as debtors, petty thieves, vagrants, and rioters. Those from New Spain were further stigmatized; their mixed racial heritage was associated in many minds with illegitimacy.

Finally, St. Augustine was a seaside presidio, the only coast guard station along 600 miles of strategic sea lane. After a storm, its vessels scoured the coast for castaways, cargoes, and naval artillery. Their presence reassured voyagers in the Fleet of the Indies, sailing northward on the Gulf Stream sixty miles offshore. When not escorting the Fleet, frigates from the presidio sailed to Havana and Veracruz for supplies, to Spain with dispatches, or to show the flag and trade with the natives in Florida's deepwater harbors, along the inland waterway, and up the St. Johns River.

As advised in the Ordinances of Pacification, the Franciscans who undertook the spiritual conquest of Florida took their "flying missions" directly to the Indians, raising crosses on town plazas, preaching, and inviting the chiefs to come and receive the king's gifts. Once in St. Augustine, the native leaders negotiated alliances of trade and mutual defense and registered a request for friars. In Spanish eyes, these acts made them and their vassals subjects of the king of Spain and Christian neophytes.

Churches and convents rose in the towns of paramount chiefs, giving them access to exotic goods, new means of making war, and spiritual power. From these mission centers, or *doctrinas*, missionaries called *doctrineros* serviced strings of outstations, or *visitas*, in subject towns. To maintain the "divine cult" in all these places, Franciscans relied on the sons of caciques, trained as sacristans, musicians, interpreters, catechists, and overseers. Orphans raised by the missionaries became their gardeners, grooms, and cooks.

The Florida situado underwrote the doctrinas much as it did the presidio. In St. Augustine's 300-man garrison, missionaries and soldiers were budgetarily interchangeable, costing the Crown 115 ducats a year apiece, and, until the number of *religiosos* on the rolls was capped at forty-three, every added friar meant one less soldier. Out of deference



Mapa del Pueblo, Fuerte y Caño de San Agustín. . . . A bird's-eye view of St. Augustine and surrounding area drawn by an unknown cartographer, probably in 1593, shows the principal structures of the town, with vertical board walls and thatched roofs and a wharf extending into the Matanzas River (left); the town's seventh wooden fort (right); and the Indian mission and town of Nombre de Dios (upper right).

to a Franciscan's vow of poverty, his stipend was issued in the form of supplies, called "alms from the king." From other royal funds the friar received a vestment allowance called "habit and sandals" and, if he was an ordained priest, an altar allowance of wine, wheat, and wax. New churches, too, were subsidized. When a town advanced to the status of a doctrina, the Crown made it a 1,000-peso baptismal gift of religious essentials: vestments, linens, images, vessels, parish registers, bells, and an altar stone. The natives prized this sacred treasure and sought to keep it whether or not they had a priest to conduct services.

From 1587 through the 1620s, Spanish efforts created a tier of mission provinces along Florida's east coast and up the north-flowing St. Johns River, with its two districts of Tidewater (Agua Salada) and Freshwater (Agua Dulce). This first wave of expansion, the Nearer Pacifications, added an element of Indian tribute and labor to the support system.

The Timucua chiefs near the presidio were the first to prove their loyalty. During the sixteenth-century wars, don Gaspar Marqués of the town of San Sebastián provided the Spaniards with scouts, porters, couriers, boatmen, and archers. When St. Augustine was temporarily overrun by castaways from the wrecks of five galleons, doña María Meléndez, cacica of Nombre de Dios and wife of a soldier, came to the rescue. The Crown rewarded her timely gift of provisions with 500 ducats worth of red cloth.

By the turn of the century, Governor Gonzalo Méndez Canzo was drafting natives from Guale province in present-day Georgia to rebuild St. Augustine, which had been destroyed by fire and a flood. The laborers received a ration of corn and a daily wage in trade goods. Thereafter, unmarried Indian males came in relays from the provinces to cultivate the soldiers' fields, or *sabanas*, in a labor levy that historians call the *repartimiento*.

Spaniards also made themselves beneficiaries of the Sabana System, which was the native method of public finance. By custom, each planting season the commoners of an Indian town planted one sabana of corn for each of their caciques or cacicas and another for the community as a whole. Now, using new iron adzes and hoes, they cleared and planted other sabanas for the "service of the convent" and the "service of the king." Nor was this their only contribution: often they were pressured to sell the surplus of their harvest to the presidio on credit, in what amounted to a forced loan.

The colony became increasingly dependent on these labor transfers, sanctioned and brokered by the Hispanicized chiefs. As a reward for their services, the rulers of the Republic of Indians were honored with ceremonial staves of office, entertained by the governor, and given gifts of European garments for themselves and cloth, blankets, and tools for their followers. The expense of "regaling" the Indians was the one open-ended fund in the situado.

A nation conquered by the gospel instead of the sword was not supposed to be subject to the labor levy, but all of the Florida pacifications seemed to turn into conquests. Years of Spanish steel, firepower, and scorched earth campaigns were required to divide and conquer the natives of the East Coast, and each chiefdom that rebelled against Spain's overlordship was reconquered and reintegrated under new terms. Meanwhile, undaunted by the Spanish presence, French corsairs continued to trade with the natives for ambergris, a perfume fixative, and sassafras and china root, popular specifics for syphilis. The regions they favored were Ais, above Cape Canaveral, and Guale, on the coast of



Mapa de la Florida y Laguna de Maymi. . . . (Map of Florida and of the lake of Maymi [Okeechobee]) drawn by an unknown Spanish cartographer during the period 1595–1600, depicts a somewhat squared-off peninsula with a misplaced Okeechobee. It is valuable for its list of place-names, from Santa Elena in the northeast around to Punta de Apalache in the west.

present-day Georgia. In 1596, the Spaniards took action by treaty, turning both Ais and Guale into provinces.

The Guale Rebellion of 1597, best known of the Florida revolts, began with the killing of five friars. The war lasted for six years, during which French corsairs came and went freely in Guale ports. At last, Governor Méndez Canzo defeated the rebel leader Juanillo and sentenced the people of his town, Tolomato, to service a portage near the capital. The province of Ais also rebelled in 1597, with more immediate consequences. A raid on the Ais town of Surruque yielded fifty captives, whom the governor condemned to terms of slavery and distributed among his men. Set free by royal order, the Surruque were relocated where they, too, could make themselves useful to the presidio, but Ais,

unlike Guale, did not return to the fold. The Eastern Timucua did their share of rebelling. In 1629, in a spontaneous uprising at the ferry town of San Juan del Puerto, a cacica and her vassals freed her brother from soldiers who were taking him, bound, to St. Augustine. Governor Luis de Rojas y Borja sentenced the cacica to hanging and her confederates to exile and hard labor in Havana, with their ears docked.

War and disease worked in tandem to empty the eastern doctrinas. Between 1613 and 1617, half of the 16,000 converted Indians in Florida and an unknown number of other natives died of a "plague," and other epidemics followed. The colony was further beset by hurricanes and pirates. The great storm of 1622 was responsible for the loss of many ships between the Keys and Bermuda. For years afterward, salvors from St. Augustine haunted the wreck sites, while Dutch and English corsairs lurked near Cape Canaveral to chase their vessels onto the shoals. More than one supply ship trying to escape these enemies ran aground on the St. Augustine sandbar. Coastal Indians traded with the interlopers as they came ashore for wood and water. No help came from the Crown. Instead, the presidio found its reinforcements and matériel diverted to other garrisons. The situado fell years behind. It was a time of short rations and shorter wages. The low point was reached in 1628 when the corsair Piet Heyn captured the entire Fleet of the Indies off the coast of Cuba, with the subsidies for all the Caribbean, including Florida, aboard. Nor did a peace treaty in Europe end hostilities in America, where hundreds of unemployed soldiers and seamen turned to piracy.

Harassed by seaborne enemies and with dwindling resources in capital and labor, the colonists turned their energies inland. Franciscans made dramatic expeditions into new territory, with banners flying and escorts of Indian arquebusiers. There was even a resurgence of interest in Menéndez's Greater Florida. In the 1630s, Governor Rojas y Borja, alone, sent three successive parties of Indians and soldiers to investigate the stories of gold mines, diamonds, and freshwater pearls told by veterans of the Juan Pardo expeditions. Two parties turned back; the third reached fabled Cofitachequi, looted by Hernando de Soto over eighty years earlier. But the Crown refused to countenance a conquest that would push the northern boundary deep into the Appalachian Mountains.

The impulse for the second wave of expansion—the Farther Pacifications, lasting from the 1630s to around 1670—was not a royal initiative but came from within the colony. In the Gulf, floridanos scented opportunities for private trade as well as fresh sources of provisions and labor. Their first step was to "pacify" the Pohoy, Tocobaga, and Calusa

who had long dominated the peninsula's Gulf Coast and rivers. Captain Juan Rodríguez de Cartaya made the western watershed safe for Christianity with a gunboat, and the result was the new mission province of Timucua, of which the northern part was sometimes called Timucua Alta, or Yustaga.

In 1633, at long last, Governor Luis de Horruytiner was ready to let the Franciscans carry the Evangel into fertile and populous Apalachee, in the Red Hills surrounding present-day Tallahassee. That province's port, he assured the Council of the Indies, would provide the Fleet with a haven from storms and corsairs, serve as a supply depot for the western missions, and guarantee the food supply for St. Augustine's 500 inhabitants. Boatloads of corn would leave the Apalachee port (San Marcos) and follow the curving coast to a Timucua port (San Martín), where the corn could be transferred to pack animals and taken overland to the capital. Something the governor did not mention was the rapidly growing city of Havana, a short week's sail from the fields of Apalachee.

The populous new provinces replenished the number of peasant farmers and repartimiento laborers in Florida. At the same time, the new ports on Gulf rivers offered outlets for a flourishing coastal trade with Havana in cured deerskins, dried corn and beans, chickens, hogs, and ranch products and drew Caribbean buccaneers into Gulf waters. That the traffic with Cuba was untaxed and unlawful and that foreign vessels were entering the western ports did not trouble caciques or floridanos. Even the friars participated, raising hogs and increasing the size of their sabanas with the object of adorning churches and bringing comfort to convents.

In the middle half of the seventeenth century, royal support for soldiers, friars, and caciques became increasingly irregular. Deeply involved in European wars and peninsular rebellions, Spain could scarcely maintain the centers, much less the peripheries. The situado was stolen by pirates, lost at sea, swamped in red tape, or sequestered by the king's command for more urgent needs. For years at a time it was not paid at all. Although eventually most of the funds would be replaced, their arrival was so unpredictable that the colony learned to rely less on the metropolis and more on its own devices.

During periods of wavering royal support, the demands on Christian Indians rose. When the situado failed to materialize, chiefs who had not received the gifts that reinforced their authority were pressed all the more urgently to have their vassals feed the Spanish. Secondary garrisons were stationed in the provincial capitals of San Luis de

Apalachee, San Francisco de Potano (in Timucua), and Santa Catalina de Guale. Settlements of floridano traders and ranchers grew up around these garrisons, and the provincial settlers, too, expected to be supplied with laborers. Natives in the provinces now had not only caciques and friars to feed but soldiers and "people of quality" as well. Juana Caterina de Florencia, wife of the deputy governor of Apalachee, expected to be supplied with fish, milk, and six women to grind corn.

Because the waters around the peninsula were dangerous and the journey by sea was long, and because cart roads were nonexistent and pack animals scarce, most of the freight between St. Augustine and San Luis was carried on Indian backs. The yearly ration for a Franciscan weighed no less than 1,800 pounds. As the number of friars increased and the supply lines to the western doctrinas lengthened to seventy leagues and longer, more and more burdener-days were required to deliver religious rations, and the packs did not travel back to St. Augustine empty but full of products from the provinces. Two mid-seventeenth-century west coast Indian rebellions would be blamed on burdening, with the friars pointing at the governors and the governors at the friars.

Governor Benito Ruíz de Salazar y Vallecilla, who secured the governorship of Florida in 1645 by promising to build a galleon, marshaled the colony's resources and embarked on a program of economic development. While the king's galleon took shape in the shipyards of Campeche, Yucatan, Salazar y Vallecilla sent the soldiers of the San Luis garrison north into Apalachicola with trade goods to exchange for deerskins. To remedy the shortage of beasts of burden he began to breed mules, and on the border between Yustaga and Apalachee he started a wheat farm.

These enterprises received a series of setbacks. The first was the Apalachee Rebellion of 1647, a kind of civil war between Christian and non-Christian chiefs. No sooner was it suppressed than the colony was stricken with the yellow fever that was sweeping through Caribbean ports. The "black vomit" killed indiscriminately—whites and blacks as well as Indians—and among the many who died was the governor. Development was interrupted a third time by the Timucua Rebellion of 1656, triggered by Governor Diego de Rebolledo's mobilization of the Indian militia after the English capture of Jamaica. Disease, famine, and fugitivism wreaked demographic havoc in central Florida. Outside of Yustaga, Timucua Province had too few inhabitants even to service the transportation network.

St. Augustine itself was badly shaken in 1668 when the privateer Robert Searles, with a patent issued by the Jamaican governor, sacked the city, killing more than a hundred people in the streets and rounding up everyone who looked African or Indian to be sold as a slave. The colony was too strategic to be abandoned to the English, as many thought it must be. Queen Regent Mariana ordered the viceroy of New Spain to make Florida a priority, bring its situado up to date, increase the Franciscan fund enough to replace the forty-three friars on the rolls with soldiers, and begin sending the Florida treasury an extra 10,000 pesos yearly with which to construct a fort of stone instead of the usual wood. In 1670, the founding of Charleston by settlers from Barbados underscored the urgency of defense measures, and the queen increased the garrison from 300 to 350 men.

Floridanos, who regarded militia service as something for Indians, appropriated a tenth of the billets in the garrison as reserve officers, or *reformados*, who received the pay of a soldier but were exempt from guard duty. They had already naturalized the benefice and lesser positions of the parish, the office of public notary, the two proprietary offices of the treasury—offices so important that those who held them doubled as a municipal council, or *cabildo*, to advise the governor—and its clerkships, and the position of defender of the Indians, which they were seeking to make permanent and salaried.

Among Florida's notable families, the Menéndez Marquéses stood out for their able family strategy. Descended from Juan Menéndez Marqués and María Menéndez y Posada, two close relatives of the sixteenth-century governor Pedro Menéndez Marqués, himself a nephew of Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, the family maintained its position and fortunes for 150 years through marriage, treasury offices, military offices, Cuban commerce, unofficial borrowing from the situado, and cattle ranching. Don Thomás Menéndez Marqués was typical. From his ranch at La Chua in the depopulated savannahs of central Florida, he shipped tallow, hides, and dried beef out the San Martín (Suwannee–Santa Fe) River and down to Havana. Although his brother, father, and grandfather had all been royal officials of the treasury, and he, his son, and his grandson would follow their lead, don Thomás had no compunction about avoiding customs duties. Floridanos honored the king's person, not his regulations, which they did not hesitate to evade or appeal.

All told, the building of St. Augustine's stone fort, the Castillo de San Marcos (Castle of Saint Mark), took twenty-four years and cost the Crown over 138,000 pesos, much of it going for Indian labor in the shellstone quarries on Anastasia Island. Twice as many native workmen

were stationed at the capital as formerly; many brought their families and settled down. The influx of money and people caused prices to rise, stimulating agriculture and ranches like don Thomás's La Chua. Even so, there were times when the royal storehouses were empty and governors had to seize the stores of private individuals. It was dangerous to do this to friars or priests, who could quickly close ranks against someone who threatened their prerogatives. Governor Juan Márquez Cabrera alienated the religious establishment throughout his administration (1680–87). In one typical instance, he ordered Captain Francisco de Fuentes, lieutenant governor of Guale, to seize some corn belonging to Father Juan de Uzeda, doctrinero of San José de Zapala, in order to provide rations for refugees from Santa Catalina de Guale who had been asked to build a fort on Sapelo Island. Denied the sacraments for his various offenses, the governor deserted his post. Governor Diego de Quiroga y Losada similarly made an enemy of parish priest Alonso de Leturiondo by exercising eminent domain over his corncrib. The priest responded by padlocking the parish church on the Feastday of St. Mark and doing his part to ruin Quiroga in the lengthy judicial review, or *residencia*, that followed every governor's term of office.

In the late seventeenth century, Florida regained its sixteenth-century reputation as a land of constant war. The provinces came under attack seasonally by pirates and by slave-raiding Indians armed with English firearms in the southeastern version of the proxy war. Yet the new royal funds for fortifications were absorbed by the castillo, with little to spare for the defense of the provinces. When the viceroy of New Spain sent an extra 6,000 pesos with which to build a stone tower on Cumberland Island for the protection of the Guale, Governor Laureano de Torres y Ayala spent it on a seawall for St. Augustine.

North of Apalachee, in the province of Apalachicola, traders from Charleston were replacing the Spanish as buyers of deerskins. Although the Apalachicola were not Christians, as allies and trading partners they had fallen within the Spanish sphere of influence since the 1640s. Florida governors tried to counter the Anglo advance with gifts, warnings, hastily founded missions, and a blockhouse to serve as a trading post, but the lure of English manufactures proved too strong. The Apalachicola moved out of the Spanish orbit and into the English one, to reenter history under the name of Creeks. Between 1680 and 1706, a major part of the Indians in the provinces also withdrew their allegiance, silently deserting their doctrinas for a life of liberty without friars, soldiers, or chiefs who were more Spanish than Indian.

The first to defect were the Guale, whose towns on the sea islands had become magnets for pirates and other predators. The Guale's declining numbers were temporarily masked by a contrary influx of Yamasee moving down the Atlantic coast. By 1696, when the Quaker Jonathan Dickinson passed through Florida, three towns of refugees on Amelia Island were all that remained of Guale province. The last to leave were the Apalachee, who forsook their province after it was invaded by Creeks and Carolinians in 1704 during Queen Anne's War (see chapter 5). Some of the Apalachee fled to Pensacola, refounded in 1698 to counter French influence in the Gulf. Some, under don Patricio de Hinachuba, chief of Ivitachuco, migrated to Timucua, then to the environs of St. Augustine, where they hoped to find safety under the guns of the fort. Others left Apalachee for parts unknown, saying that they would not stay to die with Spaniards.

The kings of Spain had seen themselves as patrons of the Florida Indians and the Indians as wards of the Crown. Royal alms supported their missionaries, royal subsidies regaled their chiefs, and a royal defender of the Indians represented their interests. But wars in Europe, spilling into America, strained the royal revenues and patrimony to the limit. The Spanish elite, floridanos and Spaniards alike, survived the war years by demanding advances of goods and services from people who were in no position to deny them. At such times, the colony survived because it was ideologically reinforced. The "cult of the king" threw a mantle of duty about forced loans and labor, while the "divine cult" taught Indians that they, like women, were natural inferiors.

To many Spaniards, Florida must have seemed a native Utopia. In this maritime periphery of strategic rather than economic importance, the goals of peaceful evangelism were largely met. Indians were not enslaved; their lands were not alienated; their lives were not shortened in mines or workhouses. Territorial expansion observed the forms of the Conquest by Contract. The rulers of the Republic of Indians, mission-trained, channeled the labor and products of Indian peasants to the priests, fighting men, and merchants of the Republic of Spaniards. In exchange, the natives were offered an afterlife in heaven, a sanctuary on earth, and useful tools, plants, and animals.

But pacification, Spain's idealistic design for the mastery of North America, depended on enduring hierarchies and exclusive relationships. The isolation on which it depended was repeatedly breached, giving common Indians a chance to show how little they cared for lords of any kind. When, in the last quarter of the seventeenth century, increasing royal investments and increasing demands on the natives strengthened the colony's center at the expense of its peripheries, the

mission hinterland—source of food, labor, and exports—sloughed away, and with it went the comparatively enlightened system of the two Republics.

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